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Memories Cloaked in Magic: Memory and Identity in Tin Man
Anne Collins Smith
Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Classical Studies
Stephen F. Austin State University
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Introduction
In Replications: A Robotic History of the Science Fiction Film [Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1995], J. P. Telotte argues that "through its long history, one
that dates back to the very origins of film, this genre [science fiction] has focused its
attention on the problematic nature of human being and the difficult task of being
human." [1-2] The thesis of the book, he states, is "relatively simple—that the image of
human artifice … is the single most important one in the genre. […] Through this image
of artifice, our films have sought to reframe the human image and reaffirm that sense of
self about which we … appear so anxious today." [5]
Substitute "magical" for "technological" – or at least, substitute a magically-infused
steampunk form of technology – and Telotte's thesis applies as well to the SciFi
channel’s miniseries Tin Man as to any other science fiction work. In particular, Tin Man
offers a varied and subtle exploration of the sense of self in terms of the issue of the
relationship between memory and identity by offering us not one but three characters
who must regain and acknowledge ownership of their memories in order to restore their
true identities, restorations which are important not only to the characters on a personal
level, but which are critical in the resolution of the plot.
******
Locke
The gold standard for beginning a discussion on self-identity in the modern age of
Western intellectual history is the philosophy of John Locke. Best known in the United
States for his Second Treatise on Government, which provided the philosophical
underpinnings of the American Revolution, Locke also propounded a highly influential
view on self-identity.
"Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one
to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things,
in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as
this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the
same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done." (Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 27, Paragraph 9)

Locke's position is often glossed as saying that memory is the key to self-identity, but he
does not precisely say that; rather, he says that consciousness of past actions is the
crucial element. This understanding can help us explore issues of memory and identity in
Tin Man.
******
Prologue: The Mystic Man
While the character of the Wizard is splintered into several analogues in Tin Man i, the
Mystic Man is the most obvious; the heroine and her three companions travel to Central
City to find him, hoping that he can help them on their quests. Upon reaching him, they
are disappointed to observe that he has become addicted to a substance known as the
Vapors that causes disassociation and memory loss. A character who knew him in the
past says, "That's not the Mystic Man I remember," clearly linking his willingness to
recognize the Mystic Man's identity to the Mystic Man's ability to access his own
memory. The Mystic Man's memory is magically restored shortly thereafter, and he is
then able to provide assistance to the characters. The transition from his first amnesiac
appearance to his magical cure takes only a few minutes; nevertheless, his case
demonstrates in microcosm the more extensive problems of memory and identity that
three of the characters face throughout the course of the entire program.
******
DG
DG (the analogue to Dorothy) is a princess of the O.Z. (the "Outer Zone," the analogue to
Oz in Tin Man), the younger daughter of the Queen. Killed at the age of five by an evil
Sorceress (whom we shall discuss later), DG was brought back to life by her mother, a
powerful magic user, and sent to live on the Otherside, that is, in our world. Her
memories of her life in the O.Z. were deliberately cloaked in magic by her mother to
safeguard valuable information. As a result, DG does not know that she is originally from
the O.Z. She does not know that she is a princess, nor does she know that she has
inherited considerable magical ability. Her life as a waitress and part-time student in
small-town Kansas is the only reality she knows. At the age of 20, DG is brought back to
the O.Z when a tornado descends on her farmhouse.
Aristotle says (Nicomachean Ethics III.1) that certain types of ignorance can relieve a
person of moral culpability, although ignorance of one's own identity is extraordinarily
unlikely:
[I]t is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to
wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed), but
ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects
with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon depend,

since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily. […] A man
may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting
on, and sometimes also what (e.g. what instrument) he is doing it with, and to
what end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce to some one's safety), and how
he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently). Now of all of these no one could
be ignorant unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the
agent; for how could he not know himself?
[http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.3.iii.html, 1110b15 – 1111a17]
On one interpretation, DG is in exactly this situation. When she says to her companions
in the O.Z., "I've never been here before," Aristotle might say that she cannot be blamed
for lying, for she is ignorant of who she is, and therefore doesn't know that she is actually
from the O.Z.
A more radical interpretation, however, and one more consonant with Locke's theory, is
that the DG who utters these words is telling the truth because she is not the DG who
lived in the O.Z. She has no access to those experiences in her memory and is thus not the
same person. Although DG's physical substance is the same as that small child, her
consciousness, that is, her true self, is not. The fact that her physical body is continuous
is, to Locke, irrelevant.
"For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself,
personal identity depends upon that only, whether it be annexed solely to one
individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances."
(II.27.10)
Locke argues that when a being has been "wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its
past existence" it is not the same self as the earlier being (II.27.14). Insofar as DG is not
conscious of her past experiences, she is not the same person who had them.
Although DG's memories of her early life have been suppressed, she has three sources of
information about the O.Z. that come to her before she travels there.
1. She frequently sketches scenes from the O.Z. as if they are fantasies from her
own imagination.
2. As the miniseries begins, DG has just begun to have dreams featuring both
memories from her life in the O.Z. and a vision of the Queen (her real mother,
whom she does not recognize); these dreams were apparently sent by the Queen
as a signal that it was time for DG to return to the O.Z.
3. Finally, DG's adoptive father Hank has been telling her stories and sayings
since childhood, making sure that she has them memorized word-for-word.
Because of her lack of memories about the O.Z., she does not understand the
significance of these stories and sayings while she is on the Otherside. Only when
she travels to the O.Z. does she realize that they provide clues to her quest. Her
adoptive mother Em explains in Part I that "our deeper purpose was to tell you the
stories of our world, stories that would prepare you for your return."

DG is initially guided in her adventures by these sources of information; she gradually
recovers information on her own, recognizing places she has been but without recalling
the experiences that she had there.
A close reading of Locke such as that proposed in John Sutton's Philosophy and Memory
Traces: Descartes to connectionism [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]
strengthens this understanding of DG's position of discontinuity. Sutton observes that
Locke explicitly moves away from an definition of memory common in earlier
philosophers as a straightforward repository of information and toward the idea of
memory as the power to revive at will perceptions that a person once experienced. [167168] While DG has access to information about the O.Z., it is quite another matter for
her to revive the perceptions that she once experienced.
Nonetheless, we must observe an important difference between DG and Locke's
theoretical being who has been "wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its past
existence." Locke only insists on a loss of identity when that consciousness has been lost
"beyond the power of ever retrieving again" [ibid]. Since DG's memories have been
cloaked in magic—a reversible process—she is able to regain consciousness of her
previous existence. Beginning in Part II, she begins to recover actual memories, depicted
as flashbacks, in which she is conscious of having experienced events from her childhood
in the O.Z.
DG's magical abilities, a significant element of her identity, are tied to her memories.
Unlike Harry Potter, her childhood in Kansas was not sprinkled with accidental
mysterious incidents; there is no mention of her banishment from the reptile house at the
local zoo. DG evinces magical powers in tandem with her recovering memory. Her first
actual use of magic coincides with her first actual memory of the O.Z. that is not a piece
of disconnected information, a dream, a sketch, or one of Hank's stories: she recognizes a
spinning doll that her old tutor carries with him, and is able to make it spin, then
remembers in a flashback the first time she made it spin as a child. Her subsequent uses
of magic are also accompanied by flashbacks to her early childhood, and she
demonstrates increasingly powerful magical abilities as she acquires more of her
memories and further integrates them into her identity. It is a struggle for her to
reintegrate this new awareness of her past experiences into her present self and one of the
themes of the miniseries is DG's transition from denial to acceptance.
Part of what makes the transition especially difficult is that DG's suppressed memories
include an experience, which she vividly relives, of her abandonment of her sister
Azkadellia during an attack by an evil Witch. DG feels tremendous guilt as she realizes
that everything that has happened since the Witch took possession of Azkadellia is at
least partly her fault. Once this transition is accomplished, however, the DG we see at the
end of the miniseries is continuous in identity both with the little princess of the
flashbacks and with the frustrated waitress of small-town Kansas.
Early in the miniseries, DG is possessed of a vague sense, similar to Neo's at the
beginning of The Matrix, that something about reality is not quite right. In Part I she tells

her adoptive parents, "This isn't my life!" and "I just don't feel at home here." Possibly
because of her sense of dislocation, DG rejects the socially-constructed identity that is
imposed upon her in Kansas. Resisting the expectations that would normally be placed on
a pretty young woman in a rural community, she dresses like a tomboy, racks up
speeding tickets on her motorcycle, and helps her adoptive father fix farm equipment. In
addition, she seeks escape metaphorically through artwork, drawing pictures of her
dreams and daydreams, and more literally by poring over travel brochures for exotic
places like Australia ii. Although she clearly rejects social norms, they nevertheless play a
role in her self-construction; her choice of jeans and sneakers is directed by her decision
not to conform to more feminine garb, while her tomboyish behavior is directed by her
decision not to adopt more ladylike hobbies. As feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger
observes, "Whether or not I accept [social] norms, negotiating them was the process by
which I became a woman." (Haslanger 2008)
Once in the O.Z., DG's social identity is entirely reconstructed, as she learns that she is a
princess who is expected to save her people by wielding magical power. She resists this
new imposition, curiously enough, by taking refuge in the identity she had previously
striven so hard to escape. When her mother appears to her in a vision to urge her on, DG
protests, "I'm a waitress. And a part-time student. I don't think I can do this." As she
gradually recovers her identity in terms of her memory, however, she also becomes more
and more capable of taking on the social identity of a world-saving princess. She never
lets go of the behaviors she has developed in resistance to social expectations in our
world; active and brave, she repeatedly rescues herself and comes to the aid of her
companions in a refreshingly nonstereotypical manner.

******
Glitch
Glitch (the analogue to the Scarecrow) has lost his memory in a different way than DG.
He was a royal adviser and inventor who had designed but not yet built a machine (partly
technological, partly magical) to extend the growing season by altering the position of the
suns, called the Sun Seeder. He refused to cooperate with the Sorceress' plan to build the
machine in an altered, evil form intended to cast the O.Z. into perpetual darkness; as a
result, she had a portion of his brain removed by alchemists, keeping it in a life-support
mechanism and extracting from it the information required. Although this is not in fact
how the human brain works—at least, not in our universe—the miniseries appears to
propose a computer analogy, as if the portion of his brain removed was the filled memory
storage, while the portion remaining to Glitch included the operating system, other
software, and enough blank storage space to form new memories. The audience, along
with DG, learns early in Part I that brain removal is a normally a punishment used to "reeducate" criminals.
Glitch has inconsistent access to his long-term memory. He does not know his real name,
or the Queen's. He does not recognize most of the people he once knew. He clings

fiercely, however, to what little he does remember, particularly his status as an adviser to
the Queen and his occupation as an intellectual; he has a strong sense of consciousness of
himself as having experienced his life in the O.Z. prior to the removal of part of his brain.
This explains why he retains such a strong sense of identity and even pride in his
previous accomplishments.
Glitch makes a number of statements that indicate his attachment to his identity,
beginning with his statement in Part I that part of his brain was removed "because of
what I know, or used to know." Unlike DG, who initially insists that she is a waitress, not
a princess, he consistently refers to his previous self as "I" and retains a strong sense of
continuity between his former and present selves. Once they get to know him, his
companions reinforce this sense of continuity. After observing a vision depicting his past
self's refusal to cooperate with the Sorceress, a refusal that led to his debrainment, the
other characters praise his self-sacrifice and refer to Glitch's previous, pre-operation self
as "you," that is, a being whose identity is continuous with Glitch in his current state.
He cannot, at will, revive all of the perceptions that he once experienced; in this respect
his long-term memory is severely damaged by the removal of part of his brain. On
several occasions, however, he does appear capable of reviving those perceptions in a
partial and disjointed manner. On another occasion, an empathic healer is able to retrieve
memories to which Glitch himself did not previously have access, which suggests that the
ability to revive further perceptions may still exist in a latent fashion. Sutton observes
[170-171] that Locke is reluctant to discuss in detail the effects upon the continuity of
identity of ordinary forgetfulness and the normal tendency of memories to fade over time;
while Glitch's loss of memory is not ordinary or normal, some inability to revive distinct
perceptions is yet compatible with continuity of identity within Locke's theory.
Locke also acknowledges the phenomenon that our memories are sometimes activated
without our conscious control, reviving earlier perceptions that we did not particularly
seek to reactivate [II.10.7; discussed in Sutton, 173]; we see this on several occasions
when Glitch unexpectedly pops up with chunks of technical detail concerning the
identification of a holographic projector or the characteristics of a rare chemical element.
Glitch's situation is thrown into sharp relief by contrast with the backstory of Cain, the
Tin Woodman analogue. Cain had joined the resistance against the Sorceress, and as
punishment his family was dragged away before his eyes while he was imprisoned in a
tin suit, held captive there until DG and Glitch let him out. While in the suit, he was
subjected to a holographic projection replaying his own capture and the seizure of his
family, over and over. Thus, he was not able to rely on the normal tendency of memories
to fade over time to soften the blow of what was done to him and the ones he loved;
rather, he was forced to re-experience those perceptions repeatedly during his
imprisonment. If we take memory in Locke's sense of a power to revive perceptions,
Cain's was artificially enhanced, while Glitch's was artificially damaged; both forms of
alteration were harmful.

In a scene that strongly echoes the Wizard's conversation with the Scarecrow, Tin Man,
and Cowardly Lion in the 1939 movie, DG assures each of her companions at a critical
moment in Part III that he already possesses the quality he seeks. She tells Glitch,
"Glitch, you're the smartest guy I know. You helped me remember my past and that's
probably the most important weapon I have now." In addition to explicitly linking
Glitch's situation to her own iii DG's speech appears to affirm that Glitch has a complete
identity of his own, whether or not he is ever reunited with the missing portion of his
brain.
When Glitch is reconnected with the missing portion of his brain toward the end of the
miniseries, he is able to retrieve the information needed to shut down the machine. He
also uses his newly recovered memory to strengthen his identity; the first thing he says is,
"My name isn't Glitch. It's Ambrose." The connection, however, lasts only long enough
to achieve the desired goal of shutting down the machine, after which Glitch is once
again disconnected. The miniseries ends very shortly thereafter and we never learn
whether he will be reconnected permanently to the missing portion of his brain. DG's
earlier speech, however, suggests that he does not need to be.
Glitch's case enables us to apply some of Locke's more outlandish thought experiments,
which otherwise might go unexplored, particularly by the squeamish. For Locke, if part
of the body is removed, and consciousness does not go along with that part of the body,
and in fact the self loses sensation and awareness of that part of the body (for example, if
a hand is cut off), then that part of the body ceases to be part of the person. We may
compare this to Glitch's missing half-a-brain, of which (except for one brief period near
the end of the third episode) he has no sensation or direct awareness. Conversely, for
Locke, if part of the body is removed and consciousness does go along with that part of
the body – he considers the possibility that a little finger is removed and that the person's
self-consciousness is contained within that little finger – then that part of the body is the
person. This again would seem to apply to Glitch's body with its remaining half-a-brain,
as being the part of him in which his consciousness is contained.
There is one difficulty with this interpretation, which results from a lacuna within the
script. We are never told whether Glitch's missing half-a-brain has its own consciousness
or not. If so, we have identity problems that go far beyond even Locke's weirdest thought
experiments. I prefer to believe that it doesn't, if only to keep from multiplying
hypotheses unnecessarily. iv
Glitch experiences another complication with regard to his identity, well known to
contemporary thinkers such as Haslanger, and also foreshadowed by Locke. Locke
proposes yet another thought experiment to examine elements of identity; this one
concerns a prince and a cobbler who swap bodies, so that the prince's consciousness now
resides in the body of the cobbler. Locke observes that identity has a social and
contextual component, so that the prince's consciousness, transferred into the body of the
cobbler, will appear to those around him to be the cobbler, even though it will still appear
to the prince to be the prince himself. Shabbily dressed in the rags of his former finery,
marked as a "headcase" by the obvious zipper down the middle of his head, Glitch looks

like a vagabond and a criminal; no one initially believes his claim to be an inventor and
royal adviser. He receives no reinforcement from society for his identity; in fact, quite the
opposite. In addition to struggling internally to maintain his own identity, Glitch must
also resist the erroneous socially-constructed identity that is constantly forced upon him.
******
The Sorceress
The character of the Sorceress (the Wicked Witch analogue) is a complicated one. At
first, the audience is led to believe that she is DG's older sister Azkadellia; later we learn
that she is a fusion creature, made up of Azkadellia herself and an evil, unnamed Witch
who has taken possession of her. v
The Witch and Azkadellia never blend into a single being like the CompanionCommissioner in the Star Trek: The Original Series episode "Metamorphosis" or the
learned gentleman and Rekh-mara in E. Nesbit's novel The Story of the Amulet. The
Sorceress is depicted on multiple occasions having conversations with herself, which the
audience comes to realize are conversations between Azkadellia and the Witch, who
retain their individual personalities. Outside of these conversations, when the Sorceress
speaks as "I," the Witch is clearly in control.
The Sorceress sometimes speaks as if she is relying solely on Azkadellia's memories, as
when she tells DG in Part II that they were friends as children, sometimes as if she is
relying solely on the Witch's memories, as when she rejoices in Part III that her plan is
coming to fruition "and this time I'll get it right." The Witch appears to be in primary
control even when the Sorceress is relating information based on Azkadellia's memories.
This is reflected in the reactions of Azkadellia's family members. At various times the
Queen tells her, "You are not my daughter" and "I am not your mother." DG says "You're
not my sister." The Sorceress herself tells Azkadellia's father that his daughter is gone.
We are shown that Azkadellia has possession of her own memories and is able to revive
her previous perceptions, but we also see the Witch constantly re-interpreting their
significance for her. During an internal conversation in Part II when the Sorceress has
returned to Azkadellia's childhood home, which DG has magically restored, Azkadellia
sighs, "We were so happy here." The Witch sharply reminds her that her family has
abandoned her, while the Witch will never abandon her.
While the Witch occasionally prods Azkadellia's memory to gain advantage vi,
Azkadellia's mother and sister believe that her memories are the key to her ability to fight
the Witch and re-assert her own identity. The Queen says to her in Part II, "And what
about you, Azkadellia? Perhaps DG isn't the only one who needs to unlock her
memories." DG helps her sister to reassert her own identity and escape from the Witch's
control by reminding her of specific events that DG has remembered from their shared
past, causing Azkadellia to revive her own perceptions of those events (depicted in
flashbacks from Azkadellia's point of view). During this conversation, both DG and

Azkadellia are represented as their childhood selves, representing a return to the
unambiguous identities that each once possessed.
Locke's philosophy is both helpful and problematic in the case of the Sorceress. The
discussion of contextual identity found in the thought experiment of the prince and the
cobbler is helpful in explaining why the Sorceress is frequently called Azkadellia, even
though the dominant personality within her is that of the Witch. She has the body and
therefore the physical appearance of Azkadellia, which determines her apparent identity
to others. Unlike Glitch and DG, who both resist their socially-constructed identities, the
Sorceress exploits her identification as Azkadellia – the elder Princess and heir to the
throne – to wield authority over her realm.
Locke's discussion of bodyswapping, however, is also problematic for this case; he
appears to assume that only one consciousness governs each substance at any given time;
the cobbler's body is "deserted by his own soul" (presumably the cobbler's consciousness
takes up residence in the prince's body). While Locke considers the possibility that more
than one consciousness could inhabit the same substance, he is referring to the theory of
metempsychosis; the separate consciousnesses would inhabit the substance sequentially,
and his point is that there is very little sense in which one such individual is the same as
another who lived a past life with the same soul. He does not address the possibility of
two consciousnesses inhabiting the same body.
Furthermore, Locke's claim that "whatever has the consciousness of present and past
actions, is the same person to whom they both belong" appears to raise a problem for the
conclusion of the miniseries. We know that the compound being known as the Sorceress
had access to the memories of both the Witch and Azkadellia. It is not clear to what
extent the individual persons within the Sorceress had access to one another's memories;
the most obvious interpretation, I believe, is that the Witch had some kind of access to
Azkadellia's, while Azkadellia may or may not have had access to the Witch's.
If Azkadellia did have access to the Witch's memories, then the miniseries might not have
ended the way we are meant to think it did. After Azkadellia re-asserts her own identity
and separates herself from the Witch, the Witch reappears in her own physical form and
is destroyed (in fact, melted). At this point we are meant to believe that the Witch is, in
fact, really most sincerely dead. If, however, Azkadellia possesses her memories, then it
is possible that the Witch still lives on, in Azkadellia. Although Azkadellia tells her
parents, "It's over. The Witch is gone," that's also exactly what the Witch would say
under those circumstances.
However, I believe this terrifying prospect may be averted by paying close attention once
again to Locke's theory. While Azkadellia may possess the information that was stored in
the Witch's memory, she would not have the consciousness of having experienced events
in the Witch's past herself and thus does not have the capability of reviving the Witch's
perceptions. Since she does not possess this consciousness or capability, she is not, and
does not possess the identity of, the Witch. This also explains why, even when they are
combined into the Sorceress, the Witch must prompt Azkadellia to revive the perception

of her past experiences at her childhood home; since memory is not merely a repository
of stored information, only Azkadellia herself has the power to bring her past experiences
to the fore. Thus we can say that the two persons within the Sorceress, who clearly differ
in personality and will, are also distinguished by their consciousness of past experences.
******
Conclusion
While concepts such as the constructedness of the self and the anxiety attendant upon our
realization thereof may appear peculiarly postmodern, in fact they are supported by a
close reading of Locke's classic theory of self identity. Whether we are considering
ourselves as bearing the responsibility to create ourselves, or whether we are concerned
about the social norms that we must negotiate in order to claim our identities, Locke
appears to foreshadow these contemporary concerns.
For Locke, our continued identity through time is not merely a matter of the static
possession of a warehouse of information (a common misunderstanding of his position).
Rather, it is a function of the power we have to revive perceptions that we have
experienced. This power, Locke admits, is subject to some normal loss over time owing
to ordinary wear and tear; we have to come to terms with the fact that we can never
wholly revive all of our perceptions, and thus the self-identity that we have the potential
to build will always be incomplete.
Three major characters in Tin Man also demonstrate possible ways in which this power to
revive our perceptions and thereby construct our identities can be damaged from without:
in DG's case, by the complete though benevolent blockage of access to her experiences,
including traumatic and guilt-inducing events that are painful for her to recover; in
Glitch's case, by the partial removal of portions of his brain in which some of his
memories were stored; in Azkadellia's case, by the constant exploitation and reinterpretation of her memories. These cases may reflect our contemporary anxieties about
reports of recovered memories of trauma, the curious problems of people with severe
brain damage, and the effects of brainwashing. Or they may reflect in an exaggerated way
our simple awareness that, as described by Locke, the construction of our self-identity is
a difficult ongoing task in which we can never completely succeed, a realization that
threatens our commonsense desire to believe in a stable self.
Telotte also argues that science fiction products not only depict our anxieties
metaphorically, but enable us to work through them. DG is able to recover and
successfully reintegrate her childhood experiences into her adult self; Glitch, despite his
situation, never loses his strong self of identity; Azkadellia is able to break out of her
conditioning and reassert her independent self. If these characters can emerge intact
despite these obstacles, then surely we can cope with the imperfections of our own
mechanisms of self-construction.
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i

DG's father Ahamo is the Othersider from Nebraska who comes to the O.Z. by accident in a State Fair
balloon; as happens to the Wizard in the book series, his name apparently derives from a misreading of the
balloon's lettering, and like the Wizard in the movie, he acts as his own gatekeeper. DG is the one who
assures her companions near the end that each already possesses the quality he seeks. Two minor
characters—a shady fortuneteller and a traveling entrepreneur—appear to reflect the 1939 movie's
Professor Marvel.
ii
A veiled reference to the original; Australia, of course, bears the nickname "Oz."
iii
Like DG's other companions, Glitch doubles and highlights an element of DG's own quest, a motif found
in many adaptations of The Wizard of Oz as well as in the original story.
iv
We actually know very little about Glitch's missing half-a-brain. It is unambiguously described as a halfa-brain (on three separate occasions), but if you look closely into the steampunk tank, it is in fact an entire
brain. (One hesitates to suggest that this may simply be a matter of the props department not reading the
script, or receiving conflicting instructions.) It not only contains the knowledge of how to build the
SunSeeder, which was mysteriously extracted from it, but it helps to control the machine as well. When
Glitch is reconnected to the half-a-brain and helps Cain begin shutting down the machine, one of the
alchemists reports from a separate control room that there is "power surging in the brain cortex—some kind
of synapse interference." In context, the alchemist speaks of the half-a-brain as if it was simply a part of the
machine. Further reinforcing the idea that the brain portion is part of the machine, when the reconnected
Glitch cannot remember the final code to shut the machine down, Cain seriously considers destroying the
half-a-brain, without which the machine cannot run. None of these details indicate that the half-a-brain has
any consciousness of its own. Glitch's sudden change in demeanor when he is reconnected may be
explained as the effect of the reintegration of the information contained in the half-a-brain into Glitch's
consciousness, rather than as evidence of an independent consciousness or personality in that half-a-brain.
v
Although the term "good witch" is not used in the miniseries, the Witch is always qualified as evil; the
term "witch" alone is apparently not sufficient to indicate automatically that someone is a "bad witch."

vi

"DG's not the only one who can remember, is she?" the Witch says at one point in Part II, which prompts
Azkadellia to remember a clue that helps the Sorceress to hunt down the long-lost Ahamo. Azkadellia's
memory is depicted as a flashback, not simply a point of information but a perception revived and relived.

